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Abstract
During recessions, the U.S. government substantially increases the duration of unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits through multiple extensions. This paper seeks to understand the incentives
driving these increases. Because of the trade-off between insurance and job search incentives, the
classic time-inconsistency problem arises. This paper endogenizes a time-consistent UI policy in a
stochastic equilibrium search model, where a government without commitment to future policies
chooses the UI benefit level and expected duration each period. A longer benefit duration increases
unemployed workers’ consumption but reduces job search, leading to higher future unemployment.
Quantitatively, the model rationalizes most of the variations in benefit duration during the Great
Recession. We use the framework to evaluate the effects of the 2009-2013 benefit extensions on
unemployment and welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the U.S. government’s decision to extend unemployment insurance (UI) du-
rations during recessions. The U.S. government has extended UI benefit durations in response to
high unemployment during every recession since the 1970s. In particular, during and following the
Great Recession, the maximum UI duration more than tripled compared to normal times, and the
whole extension program lasted for more than four years. Studies in the optimal policy literature
find it hard to reconcile the optimal UI policy over the business cycle with the direction and scale
of the extensions policy.1 Departing from the optimal policy literature that assumes government
commitment to future policies, this paper studies the decisions of a government who cannot or would
not make promises about future policies.
Government commitment is an important margin. In the presence of the trade-off between in-
surance and job search incentive, the classic time-inconsistency problem arises. Intuitively, before
workers decide job search effort, the government optimally wants to use less generous benefits to
incentivize search; once search and unemployment have realized, the government instead wants to
use more generous benefits to help smooth out consumption.2 A government without commitment
cannot make promises about future benefit policies, and so it lacks the proper tools to incentivize job
search when the workers’ search intensity depends on the expected future value of unemployment.
Evidence suggests that benefit duration extensions during recessions are discretionary decisions based
on current economic conditions (e.g. productivity, unemployment) and are not pre-committed poli-
cies.3 Therefore, to understand the government’s behavior, it is natural to consider a government
who cannot make promises about future policies.
We find that a government without commitment optimally chooses benefit extensions that quan-
titatively resemble those in the U.S. between 2009 and 2013. Lack of commitment is the key to
generating this quantitative result: It is ex-ante optimal to promise less generous benefits when the
unemployment is high, but a government without commitment cannot make such promises. As a
result, our quantitative results are more in line with the reality than do models with government
commitment. Because of the quantitative relevance of the model, we also use it to evaluate the
impacts of benefit extensions on the aggregate unemployment rate and welfare during the Great
Recession. Our approach addresses the common endogeneity problem of policy evaluations; it also
allows the workers and firms to form expectations about future extension policies that are chosen
endogenously by the government.
Underlying these results is an equilibrium business cycle model with a government and private
sector consisting of workers and firms. We use the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium to char-
acterize the decisions of a government without commitment. Because the equilibrium restricts the
government’s policy rules to depend only on current payoff-relevant states, the policies are time-
1 See, for example, Jung and Kuester (2015) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)
2 Section 7.1 provides a numerical illustration of this time-inconsistency problem.
3 We discuss this in Section 6.1.
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consistent. Specifically, a welfare-maximizing central government chooses the UI benefit level and
the probability that the benefit expires (“benefit exhaustion probability”) each period depending on
the current levels of unemployment and aggregate productivity.4 Modeling the benefit exhaustion
probability rather than a fixed length of benefits keeps the government’s decision tractable. At the
same time, the inverse of benefit exhaustion probability gives the expected duration, which allows for
comparison with empirical evidence on benefit extensions. A key assumption here is that once bene-
fits expire, the unemployed worker does not regain eligibility until he finds a job. Such a UI system is
consistent with the actual UI policy in the U.S. Under this assumption, the unemployed workers with
benefits search less than those without benefits. As a result, benefit duration policy today, through
changing the proportion of unemployed workers with and without benefits, directly affects the states
of the economy (unemployment and the measure of benefit-eligible unemployed workers) inherited
by the future government and thus the future policies. In equilibrium, the government follows the
same policy rules each period.
The private sector’s decisions are modeled using a search-matching model with risk-averse work-
ers, endogenous search intensity by the unemployed, and business cycles driven by shocks to aggregate
labor productivity. Unemployed workers search for jobs, while firms post vacancies. Both parties
make decisions given the government’s policy choices. Because future government policies affect
their expected future value, their decisions also depend on their expectations about future govern-
ment policies. Generous future benefit policies reduce worker’s incentives to search, which in turn
lowers firm’s incentives to create vacancies. Since the government’s duration policy directly affects
the future states of the economy and in turn affecting the private sector’s expectations about fu-
ture policies, the government’s policy decision has to take into account the effect of expectations on
private choices.5
The main trade-off associated with the government’s duration policy is between insurance and
incentives.6 A longer duration increases the UI coverage today and thus raising the average insurance
for the unemployed workers. It also reduces the average job search through an increase in the share of
unemployed workers receiving benefits, which raises the future unemployment and alters the private
sector’s expectations about future policies. Over the business cycle, the UI duration is strongly
countercyclical. In response to a drop in productivity, the expected future productivity is low,
4 Because we want to use the model to study observed UI variations, we keep the policy parameters as close to
reality as possible. For example, we abstract from the type of employment history-dependent UI policy analyzed in
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
5 The government’s choice of the benefit level, in contrast to the duration, is static in our model. In particular,
benefit level does not affect the future unemployment, and so there is no intertemporal dimension to the choice of
benefit level. The government sets benefit level to achieve the best income redistribution within the period.
6 UI can also affect economic activities through liquidity (e.g. Shimer and Werning 2007; Chetty 2008) and aggregate
demand (e.g. Kekre 2015; Di Maggio and Kermani 2016) channels. The workers in our setup do not borrow and save,
and so we essentially shut down the liquidity channel. Also, literature emphasizing liquidity effect has focused on benefit
level, while we examine changes of the UI duration, which plausibly have little liquidity effect on the unemployed. In
theory, UI, as a redistribution of income from rich to poor, can raise the aggregate demand because of differential
marginal propensities to consume. The empirical support for this channel has studied the effect of different benefit
levels. The effect of duration changes is less clear.
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which implies a low marginal return to production tomorrow and a low marginal gain from job
creation today. As a result, the cost of a higher expected duration is low, and the government raises
UI duration. As the unemployment rate rises, the marginal gain from increasing UI duration is
higher as more unemployed workers receive benefits, and as a result, the expected duration increases
further.7
Because our model generates cyclical movements of UI policy that are consistent with empirical
observations, the model can potentially be used to answer quantitative questions about UI benefit
extensions. Before that, we validate our model along three dimensions. First, we check if a calibrated
version of the model correctly predicts the generosity of UI policy in steady state. Calibrated to the
steady-state U.S. labor market and the average replacement ratio, the model generates a steady-state
UI duration of 26.3 weeks, compared to 26 weeks in the U.S. Second, without directly targeting the
business cycle properties in calibration, the calibrated model generates labor market volatilities that
are very close to the data. Lastly, we test to see how well our model can account for variations in
UI duration in recessions. We apply the model to the U.S. economy during the Great Recession by
feeding in the exogenous job separation rates from the data and calibrating labor productivity to
match the observed path of unemployment rates from 2008 to the end of 2013. Overall, our model
matches the variations in duration very well, generating the correct timing of duration changes as
well as 80% of the overall increase in UI duration.
An implication of our theory is that the Markov policy, by increasing UI duration in recessions,
contributes to higher unemployment. Using the calibrated model, we ask how much of the increase
in the unemployment rate can be accounted for by UI benefit extensions as opposed to general
economic conditions. In particular, we compare the Markov-perfect equilibrium to an economy
where the government does not change UI policy in recessions. The same paths of job separation
rates and productivity shocks, which generate a peak of 10% unemployment rate in the Markov
equilibrium, lead to a peak of only 6.7% under the no-extensions policy. In other words, about 3.3
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate during this period can be accounted for by rising
UI benefit extensions.
An important mechanism of our model works through expectations: when unemployment is high,
the unemployed workers expect longer UI durations in the future, and in response reduces job search.
To investigate how much workers’ expectation contributes to the 3.3-percentage point unemployment
gap, we turn off the expectations effect and obtain an unemployment gap of less than 1 percentage
point, which implies that more than two-thirds of the unemployment gap attributable to UI benefit
extensions is driven by expectations. We also perform welfare evaluations of the extension policy.
7 The idea that the welfare gains and costs of UI vary over the business cycle is not new. For example, Krueger and
Meyer (2002) argue that the efficiency loss from reduced search effort may be smaller during a recession than during
a boom. More recently, Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015) empirically estimate the moral hazard cost and consumption
smoothing benefit of UI benefits, and they find that the marginal welfare cost from generous benefits is procyclical and
the marginal welfare gain is modest and varies positively with unemployment rate. While they focus on the changing
moral hazard effect of UI benefits on individual workers, we investigate the optimal government’s response to the
changing efficiency loss.
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This paper makes two main contributions. First, we characterize the time-consistent UI policy
over the business cycle of a government without commitment to future policies. While a long tra-
dition of literature have studied the optimal UI policy (for example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997;
Wang and Williamson 2002; Shimer and Werning 2008; Chetty 2008; Golosov, Maziero, and Men-
zio 2013), the cyclical response of optimal UI is a relatively new topic. Even less is known about
the time-consistent UI policy.8 The present paper fills the gap by characterizing time-consistent UI
policy using the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept, focusing on its cyclical responses to changes
in the underlying economic conditions. In addition to generating realistic cyclicality, our theory
delivers quantitatively relevant variations in the UI durations, thus giving us a framework to address
quantitative questions.
Second, this paper quantifies the impact of benefit extensions on unemployment and welfare. We
are not the first to evaluate the extensions policy (see, for example, Fujita 2010; Rothstein 2011;
Nakajima 2012; Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman 2015; Mitman and Rabinovich 2016). Our ap-
proach addresses the potential policy endogeneity of most empirical works. Among the structural
studies, Nakajima (2012) computes a deterministic transition economy where the extension policy
path is exogenous and slowly revealed in stages. Mitman and Rabinovich (2016) estimate a govern-
ment’s response function using historical extensions and unemployment data. Our approach is more
similar to the latter in that the private sector forms expectations about future policies based on the
policy rules in a stochastic environment, and our evaluation of the extensions policy is also more in
line with their results.9
In addition to the two main contributions, this paper also makes empirical contributions. Em-
pirically, we document that UI duration increased during all recessions since the 1970s. We find
consistent patterns across these recessions. First, UI durations reach their highest levels around the
time that unemployment rates peak. Second, recessions with higher peak unemployment rates are
also associated with larger UI duration increases.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment and defines
the private-sector competitive equilibrium. Section 3 defines the Markov-perfect equilibrium. We
characterize the solution to the government’s problem using the GEE and solve the equilibrium.
Section 4 describes the parametrization strategy. We conduct equilibrium analysis in Section 5
by presenting the Markov government’s policy rules and discussing their implications for the labor
market. Section 6 provides quantitative analysis of UI benefit extensions during recessions. Section 7
compares the long-run properties of Markov and Ramsey policies. Section 8 concludes. We relegate
8 See, for instance, Alesina and Tabellini (1990); Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003); Chari and Kehoe (2007); Battaglini
and Coate (2008); Yared (2010) for studies of other time-consistent policies.
9 Admittedly, we don’t need a model without government commitment to perform this policy evaluation. In
fact, computing the endogenous government policy limits the amount of details in our model; for example, we don’t
have private borrowing/saving decision and the tier structure of benefit extensions as present in Nakajima (2012).
Nevertheless, we find by using an endogenous government policy we capture the uncertain expectation about future
policies. In Nakajima (2012), the private sector expects that the extensions are temporary and will eventually revert
back to steady state. In our case, the private sector forms expectations about future policies based on the anticipated
future economic conditions.
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all derivations, sensitivity analysis, additional figures, and a detailed review of the related literature
to the Appendix.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the model environment and characterize the competitive equilibrium.
The model is based on a search-matching model with aggregate productivity shocks.
2.1 Model environment
Time is discrete and infinite. The model is inhabited by a mass of infinitely lived workers and firms.
The measure of workers is normalized to one. In any given period, a worker can be either employed
or unemployed. Some unemployed workers receive UI benefits. Workers are risk averse and maximize
expected lifetime utility given by
E0
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡 [𝑈(𝑐𝑡)− 𝑣(𝑠𝑡)]
where E0 is the period 0 expectation factor, and 𝛽 is the time discount factor. Period utility comprises
of utility from consumption of goods 𝑈(𝑐) and disutility from job search activity 𝑣(𝑠). Utility is
increasing in 𝑐 and decreasing in 𝑠. To study the insurance incentive of the government we assume
that 𝑈(·) is a concave function. Only unemployed workers choose positive search intensity; that is,
there is no on-the-job search. Each period, an employed worker gets paid wages from production.
Wage determination technology is specified later in this section. An unemployed worker, if on
unemployment benefits, receives 𝑏 from the government. In addition, an unemployed worker also
produces ℎ, which we take as the combined value of leisure, home production, and welfare. There
are no private insurance markets and workers cannot save or borrow.
Firms are risk neutral and maximize the expected discounted sum of profits, with the same
discount factor 𝛽. A firm can be either matched to a worker (and producing) or vacant. A vacant
firm posting a vacancy incurs a flow cost 𝜅.
Unemployed workers and vacancies form new matches. Let 𝐼 and 𝑉 denote the aggregate search
by unemployed worker and the aggregate vacancy posting by firms, respectively. Then the number of
new matches formed in a period is given by the matching function 𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ). The matching function
exhibits constant returns to scale, is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments,
and is bounded above by the number of expected matches: 𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ) ≤min{𝐼,𝑉 }. The job-finding
probability per efficiency unit of search intensity, 𝑓 , and the job-filling probability per vacancy, 𝑞,
are functions of labor market tightness, 𝜃 = 𝑉 /𝐼. More specifically,
𝑓(𝜃) =
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 )
𝐼
=𝑀(1,𝜃)
𝑞(𝜃) =
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 )
𝑉
=𝑀
(︂1
𝜃
,1
)︂
.
6
(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1)
𝑡 policy (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 )
benefit-eligible:
𝑢1(1− 𝑑)
production
consumption
search, vacancy posting
separation → 𝑢1′
𝑢′,𝑢1′
𝑧′
𝑡+ 1
Figure 1: Timing of events.
Following the assumptions made on 𝑀 , 𝑓(𝜃) is increasing in 𝜃 and 𝑞(𝜃) is decreasing in 𝜃. The
job-finding probability for an unemployed searching with intensity 𝑠 is 𝑠𝑓(𝜃). Existing matches are
destroyed exogenously with constant job separation probability 𝛿.
Each period, a matched pair of a worker and a firm produces 𝑧, where 𝑧 is the aggregate labor
productivity. 𝑧 is equal to 𝑧 in steady state.
2.2 Government policy
The government cannot borrow or lend; instead, it balances the budget each period. The government
finances unemployment benefits 𝑏 through a lump sum tax, 𝜏 , on all workers, both employed and
unemployed.10 The government budget constraint is
𝜏 = 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑏. (1)
The government decides the generosity of the UI program by varying (1) benefit level, 𝑏 ≥ 0,
and (2) the benefit exhaustion probability 𝑑 (1/𝑑 is the expected duration). Once a benefit level
and exhaustion probability are determined, previously benefit-eligible unemployed workers receive
benefits 𝑏 with probability 𝑑.
2.3 Timing
The timing of events within a period is illustrated in Figure 1 and is as follows. The economy enters
period 𝑡 with a measure of the total unemployed workers 𝑢 and a measure of the benefit-eligible
unemployed workers 𝑢1. The aggregate shock 𝑧 is then realized. (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) are the aggregate states
of the economy.
Once government policies (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ) for the period are announced, 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢1(1 − 𝑑) workers
receive benefit. In other words, with probability 𝑑, unemployed workers previously with benefits lose
benefit status in this period.
Employed workers produce 𝑧 and receive wages 𝑤. Unemployed workers produce ℎ and, if receiv-
ing benefits, receive 𝑏. All workers pay a lump sum tax 𝜏 .
10 We experiment with alternative tax structures where either only employed workers pay tax, or employed and
benefit-eligible unemployed workers pay tax. Results are not presented in the paper but are available upon request.
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Given aggregate states and government policies for the period, unemployed workers with and
without benefits choose search intensity 𝑠1 and 𝑠0, respectively. At the same time, firms decide how
many vacancies to post, at cost 𝜅 per vacancy. The aggregate search is then 𝐼 = 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)𝑠1 + (𝑢−
𝑢1(1− 𝑑))𝑠0, aggregate vacancy posting is 𝑉 , and market tightness is equal to 𝜃= 𝑉 /𝐼. The fraction
of unemployed workers with and without benefits who find jobs is 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1 and 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0, respectively.
At the same time, a fraction 𝛿 of the existing 1 − 𝑢 matches are exogenously destroyed. Newly
unemployed workers and unemployed workers with benefits constitute next period’s state 𝑢1.11
The laws of motion of unemployed workers are
total unemployment: 𝑢′ = 𝛿(1− 𝑢)⏟  ⏞  
newly unemployed
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)(𝑢− 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)⏟  ⏞  
previously unemployed who didn’t find job
(2)
unemployed with benefit: 𝑢1
′
= 𝛿(1− 𝑢)⏟  ⏞  
newly unemployed
+ (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)⏟  ⏞  
benefit-eligible unemployed who didn’t find job
(3)
2.4 Workers
Denote by 𝑔 the government policy (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ). In what follows we suppress the functional arguments
in 𝜃, which is an object determined in equilibrium. Wage 𝑤 also depends on states of the economy,
and may be an equilibrium object. The wage determination process is specified later. A worker
unemployed and with benefits consumes ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 and chooses search intensity 𝑠1; an unemployed
worker without benefits consumes ℎ− 𝜏 and chooses search intensity 𝑠0. With probability 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠, 𝑠=
{𝑠0,𝑠1}, he finds a job and starts working the following period. Let 𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and 𝑉 𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔)
be the values of an employed and an unemployed worker, respectively, with the beginning-of-period
measures of unemployed workers with and without benefits (𝑢,𝑢1) and realized aggregate shock 𝑧,
given government policy for that period 𝑔 = (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ).
The optimization problem of an unemployed worker without benefits (superscript 0 denotes no
benefits) is
𝑉 0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = max
𝑠0
𝑈 (ℎ− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠0) + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝛽E𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′), (4)
and the problem of an unemployed worker with benefit is
𝑉 1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = max
𝑠1
𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠1) + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝛽E
[︁
𝑑′𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
]︁
. (5)
11 Effectively, newly unemployed workers qualify for benefits with probability 1− 𝑑. In reality, newly unemployed
workers qualify for benefits with at least two quarters of earnings and must pass an “earnings test” that depends on
individual state policies. We model it as a probability for simplicity here.
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A worker entering a period employed produces and consumes his wage 𝑤 minus tax 𝜏 . With
probability 𝛿, he loses his job and becomes unemployed the following period. There is no intra-
temporal search, so a newly separated worker remains unemployed for at least one period. The
Bellman equation of an employed worker is then
𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 𝑈(𝑤− 𝜏 ) + (1− 𝛿)𝛽E𝑉 𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
+𝛿𝛽E
[︁
𝑑′𝑉 0(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑑)′𝑉 1(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′)
]︁
. (6)
2.5 Firms
To be matched with a worker and start production, a firm posts a vacancy.12 A firm that posts a
vacancy incurs a flow cost 𝜅. With probability 𝑞(𝜃), a vacancy is filled and ready for production
the following period. Let 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) be the value of an unmatched firm posting a vacancy. The
Bellman equation of an unmatched firm is
𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = −𝜅+ 𝑞(𝜃)𝛽E𝐽𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + (1− 𝑞(𝜃))𝛽E𝐽𝑢(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′), (7)
where 𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) is the value of a matched firm. In equilibrium, under free-entry condition, the
firm will post vacancies 𝑣(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) until 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 0.
A matched firm receives output net of wages 𝑧 − 𝑤. With constant probability 𝛿, a match is
destroyed at the end of period. The Bellman equation of a matched firm is
𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 𝑧 −𝑤+ (1− 𝛿)𝛽E𝐽𝑒(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′) + 𝛿𝛽E𝐽𝑢(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′ ;𝑔′). (8)
2.6 Wage determination
When a match is formed, the economic rent is shared between the firm and the worker. To introduce
wage rigidity, we set wages to be a function of productivity. In particular, wages increase in labor
productivity 𝑧, but less than one to one. As such, workers and firms share the risk of fluctuating
aggregate labor productivity.
While Nash bargaining is widely used in the search and matching framework, people have used
other wage determination specifications. The main challenge of Nash bargaining is its difficulty in
generating the amount of observed fluctuations in unemployment. Various works in the literature
have used alternate specifications to introduce wage rigidity to achieve the desired fluctuations: Hall
and Milgrom (2008) adopt alternating-offer wage bargain; Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2010) and
Nakajima (2012) use a specification similar to the one we use; Jung and Kuester (2015) introduce
countercyclical bargaining power of workers. The main advantage of the specification we use is it
allows us to calibrate the degree of wage rigidity directly from data. The main drawback is because
12 The firms can be viewed as a representative firm with a collection of jobs and several vacancies.
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wages do not depend on workers’ outside options, benefit policies have no effect on wages, which is
the macro channel emphasized in Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013).
2.7 Competitive equilibrium
Definition 1. (Competitive equilibrium) Given a policy 𝑔= (𝑏,𝑑,𝜏 ) and initial conditions (𝑧−,𝑢−,𝑢1−),
a competitive equilibrium consists of (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1)–measurable functions for worker’s search intensity
𝑠0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) and 𝑠1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), market tightness 𝜃(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), total unemployment 𝑢′(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), and
the measure of unemployed workers with benefit 𝑢1′(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), and value functions 𝑉 𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔),
𝑉 0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), 𝑉 1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), 𝐽𝑒(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔), and 𝐽𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) such that for all (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔):
• the value functions satisfy the worker and firm Bellman equations (4)-(8);
• the search intensities 𝑠0 and 𝑠1 solve the unemployed worker’s maximization problem of (4)
and (5), respectively;
• the market tightness 𝜃 is consistent with the free-entry condition, 𝑉 𝑢(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔) = 0;
• measures of unemployment satisfy the laws of motion (2)-(3).
2.8 Characterization of private-sector optimality
The competitive equilibrium can be characterized by three optimality conditions.13 Appendix C
contains a derivation of the optimality conditions. In what follows, primes denote variables of the
following period, and subscripts denote derivatives.
The optimal choice of search intensity 𝑠0 and 𝑠1 for the unemployed worker is characterized by
no benefit: 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽E
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′ )𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
(9)
with benefit: 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽E𝑑′
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′ )𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
+𝛽E(1− 𝑑′)
[︃
𝑈(𝑤′ − 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏′ − 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠1′ ) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠1′ − 𝛿)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′ )
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
. (10)
The worker’s optimality conditions state that the marginal cost (left-hand side) of increasing the job-
finding probability equals the marginal benefit (right-hand side). The marginal cost is the marginal
disutility of search of the unemployed worker weighted by the aggregate job-finding rate per efficiency
unit of search. The marginal benefit is the sum of utility gain from being employed in the next period
and the benefit of economizing on future search cost. A higher future benefit 𝑏′ or a higher future
duration 1/𝑑′ reduces the utility gain from being employed in the next period and thus lowers the
marginal benefit of search today.
13 To economize on notation, we suppress the dependence on (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔). It should be understood throughout that
the optimal decisions are functions with arguments (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1;𝑔).
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From firm’s free-entry condition
𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
= 𝛽E
[︂
𝑧′ −𝑤′ + (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃′)
]︂
, (11)
where the marginal cost (left-hand side) equals the marginal benefit (right-hand side) of a filled
vacancy. The marginal cost is the flow cost of posting a vacancy weighted by the probability of
filling that vacancy. The marginal benefit is the profits from employing a worker. Because a newly
formed match does not become operational until the next period, the benefit from production has
components only from the next period.
3 Markov Equilibrium
In this section, we define the Markov-perfect equilibrium in our economy. We assume the government
is a utilitarian planner, who maximizes the expected value of a worker’s utility. The government
policy instruments include benefit level 𝑏, expected duration 1/𝑑, and tax 𝜏 . We consider government
policies that are time consistent using the Markov-perfect equilibrium, à la Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-
Rull (2008).
Intuitively, one can think of the economy as having a different government each period. Each
successive government chooses only current policy, taking future governments’ policies as given.
In other words, today’s government cannot directly choose future policies. Instead, both today’s
government and private sector take form an expectation about future government policy rules when
making decisions. Like Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), we focus on equilibria where government
policy depends differentiably on the aggregate states of the economy.14
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Because the economy consists of a mass of
workers and firms, the private sector take future government policies as given.15 The equilibrium
described above can be equivalently stated as an equilibrium where the government chooses policy
and private-sector allocations together given the state of the economy. To reduce the number of
policy instruments in the government’s problem, we use the following function derived from the
government’s budget constraint to express tax
𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑) := 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)𝑏.
14 While there is not a proof for the existence and uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium, Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2014) provide argument for the existence of Markov-perfect equilibrium with continuous decision rules.
15 The current government policies are decided before the private sector moves. The future government policies will
depend on future states, which are affected by how the private sector moves today. Each worker or firm does not
consider how their action will affect future policies through changing future states.
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The government period return function is equal to the average welfare of all workers, and is given by
𝑅(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1) = (1− 𝑢)𝑈(𝑤(𝑧)−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑)) worker
+(𝑢− 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)) [︀𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑))− 𝑣(𝑠0)]︀ unemployed without benefit
+𝑢1(1− 𝑑) [︀𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏−𝒯 (𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑))− 𝑣(𝑠1)]︀ unemployed with benefit
Definition 2. (Markov-perfect equilibrium) A Markov-perfect equilibrium consists of a value func-
tion 𝐺, government policy rules Ψ𝑏 and Ψ𝑑, and private decision rules
{︀
𝑆0,𝑆1,Θ,Γ,𝑢1−
}︀
such that
for all aggregate productivity 𝑧 and unemployment states (𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑏 = Ψ𝑏(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑑 = Ψ𝑑(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1),
𝑠0 = 𝑆0(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑠1 = 𝑆1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝜃 = Θ(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), 𝑢′ = Γ(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1), and 𝑢1′ = Γ1(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) solve
max
𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1𝜃,𝑢′,𝑢1′
𝑅(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1,𝑏,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1) + 𝛽E𝐺(𝑧′,𝑢′,𝑢1′)
subject to
• The worker’s laws of motion
𝑓1(𝑢,𝑢1,𝑑,𝑠0,𝑠1,𝜃,𝑢0
′
) := 𝑢′ − 𝛿(1− 𝑢)− 𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)− (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝑢= 0 (12)
𝑓2(𝑢,𝑢1,𝑑,𝑠1,𝜃,𝑢1
′
) := 𝑢1
′ − 𝛿(1− 𝑢)− (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑) = 0; (13)
• The private-sector optimality conditions below, writing 𝒪= (𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1) to economize on notation
𝜂1(𝑠
0,𝜃,𝒪′;Ψ𝑏,Ψ𝑑,𝑆0,𝑆1,Θ)
:=
𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛽E
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆0(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽E
[︂
(1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆0(𝒪′))𝑣𝑠(𝑆
0(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) − 𝛿
𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
= 0 (14)
𝜂2(𝑠
1,𝜃,𝒪′;Ψ𝑏,Ψ𝑑,𝑆1,Θ)
:=
𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛽EΨ𝑑(𝒪′)
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝐼 ′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆0(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽EΨ𝑑(𝒪′)
[︂
(1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆0(𝒪′))𝑣𝑠(𝑆
0(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) − 𝛿
𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
−𝛽E(1−Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))
[︁
𝑈(𝑤(𝑧′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′)))−𝑈(ℎ+Ψ𝑏(𝒪′)−𝒯 (𝑢1′ ,Ψ𝑏(𝒪′),Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))) + 𝑣(𝑆1(𝒪′))
]︁
−𝛽E(1−Ψ𝑑(𝒪′))[1− 𝑓(Θ(𝒪′))𝑆1(𝒪′)− 𝛿]𝑣𝑠(𝑆
1(𝒪′))
𝑓(Θ(𝒪′)) = 0 (15)
𝜂3(𝜃,𝒪′;Θ) := 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
− 𝛽E
[︂
𝑧′ −𝑤(𝑧′) + (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(Θ(𝒪′))
]︂
= 0; (16)
• The government value function satisfies the functional equation
𝐺(𝒪) ≡ 𝑅(𝑧,𝑢,𝑢1,Ψ𝑏(𝒪),Ψ𝑑(𝒪),𝑆0(𝒪),𝑆1(𝒪)) + 𝛽E𝐺(𝑧′,Γ(𝒪),Γ1(𝒪)).
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The Markov government chooses current policy, knowing how the private sector will behave given
the policy.16 More specifically, the current Markov government weighs the trade-off between current
and future welfare. By choosing a longer expected duration 1/𝑑, the current government increases
the share of unemployed workers receiving benefits today, thus raising the current welfare. At the
same time, because of moral hazard problem, unemployed workers on benefits choose lower search
intensity, and as a result higher duration reduces the average search intensity, leading to higher future
unemployment and lower future welfare.17
In addition, because all successive governments follow the same set of policy rules, the current
government, by choosing current policy, affects the policies of future governments through changing
future states of the economy. This disciplining effect, through private-sector expectations of future
policies, affects job search of unemployed workers on benefits today, and through general equilibrium
effects, affects job search of benefit-ineligible unemployed and firms’ vacancy posting. The current
government correctly anticipates this effect when choosing today’s policy. Proposition 1 provides
the conditions that characterize government decisions. The proof involves deriving the GEE and is
included in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. Given the aggregate states of the economy and the private-sector optimality con-
ditions, the unemployment benefit policy 𝑏 in the Markov-perfect equilibrium is characterized by
𝑅𝑏 = 0, (17)
and policy 𝑑 associated with the expected benefit duration can be characterized by the GEE
0 = 𝑅𝑑 − 𝑓1𝑑𝜆
+
𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
{︃
𝜂1𝑢1′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢1′
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂
+ . . .
· · ·+ 𝜂3𝑢1′
𝜂3𝜃
[︁
−𝜆𝑓1𝜃 − 𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)− 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
(𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0)−
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
(︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
)︂]︁}︃
+𝛽E
(︂
− 𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑢1 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢1
]︀
+𝛽E
(︂
− 𝑓2𝑑
𝑓2𝑢1′
)︂(︂
−𝑓
′
2𝑢1
𝑓 ′2𝑑
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀
, (18)
16 Equivalently, in the setup here, the government chooses both policy and private-sector allocations, taking into
consideration private-sector optimality conditions.
17 A secondary effect exists through taxation. With longer duration, more unemployed workers receive benefits and
the lump-sum tax is higher. The scale of this marginal cost of longer duration is small relative to the other two effects.
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where 𝜆 is the shadow price of unemployment characterized by
0 = 𝜆
+
{︃
𝜂1𝑢′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢′
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂
+ . . .
· · ·+ 𝜂3𝑢′
𝜂3𝜃
[︁
−𝜆𝑓1𝜃 − 𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)− 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
(𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0)−
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
(︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
)︂]︁}︃
−𝛽E[︀𝑅′𝑒 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑒]︀
−𝛽E
(︂
−𝑓
′
2𝑢
𝑓 ′2𝑑
)︂[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀
. (19)
The benefit level 𝑏 affects only current welfare and does not have an effect on the states of future
economy.18 As a result, 𝑏 is set at a level that equates the marginal benefit (higher consumption
for unemployed workers with benefits) and marginal cost (higher lump-sum tax) on current welfare.
The equation 𝑅𝑏 = 0 reflects such incentives.
In contrast, the choice of 𝑑 is more complex. The GEE (Equation 18) provides a way to interpret
the incentives of the government when choosing 𝑑. From (18), any change in 𝑑 has four effects. First,
it directly affects the trade-off between current consumption and future unemployment (first line).
In particular, a lower 𝑑 (higher expected duration) increases current welfare by increasing the share
of unemployed workers receiving benefits. This is the insurance effect. At the same time, a lower 𝑑
also reduces average search, thus increasing future unemployment.19 Second, through changing the
expectation of future duration it affects current job search of benefit-eligible unemployed workers.
This is the moral hazard effect. Changes in search of benefit-eligible unemployed workers in turn
affect average job search and vacancy posting through general equilibrium effects (second and third
lines). Third, any change in 𝑑 affects future consumption through changing future unemployment
(fourth line). This and the second effect together represent the “search/leisure” trade-off—lower 𝑑
increases future unemployment, which in equilibrium reduces search today through a higher expected
𝑑′, thus increasing current welfare. Lastly, through changing 𝑑′, any change in 𝑑 changes the future
trade-off between consumption and unemployment (last line). The weight on the last line can be
thought of as 𝑑𝑑′/𝑑𝑑 holding the two flow equations at zero and unemployment after the next period
unchanged. The government determines current 𝑑 by setting the net marginal value of 𝑑 to zero.
Note that the GEE does not contain explicitly the derivative of Ψ𝑑; it appears indirectly in the
18 While the current benefit level does not affect search behavior, higher expected future benefit levels reduce current
search incentive of an unemployed worker with benefits.
19𝑓1𝑑 = 𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠
0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1 is the marginal change in unemployment when 𝑑 changes.
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private-sector auxiliary function derivatives. In particular, the derivatives with respect to 𝑢′ are
𝜂1𝑢′ ≡ 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝑢′ +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑏′
Ψ𝑏
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑑′
Ψ𝑑
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑠0′
𝑆0
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑠1′
𝑆1
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
𝜂2𝑢′ ≡ 𝜕𝜂2𝜕𝑢′ +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑏′
Ψ𝑏
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑑′
Ψ𝑑
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑠1′
𝑆1
′
𝑢 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
𝜂3𝑢′ ≡ 𝜕𝜂3𝜕𝑢′ +
𝜕𝜂3
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
,
and the derivatives with respect to 𝑢1′ are
𝜂1𝑢1′ ≡
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑢1′
+
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑏′
Ψ𝑏
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑑′
Ψ𝑑
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑠0′
𝑆0
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝑠1′
𝑆1
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢1⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
𝜂2𝑢1′ ≡
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑢1′
+
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑏′
Ψ𝑏
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑑′
Ψ𝑑
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝑠1′
𝑆1
′
𝑢1 +
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢1⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
𝜂3𝑢1′ ≡
𝜕𝜂3
𝜕𝑢1′
+
𝜕𝜂3
𝜕𝜃′
Θ′𝑢1⏟  ⏞  
disciplining effect
.
This reflects an important point made earlier—that successive governments agree on a policy rule
Ψ𝑑. The Markov government does not try to manipulate its successor through changing current
𝑑, hence the absence of directives of Ψ𝑑 directly from the GEE. The fact that Ψ𝑑 affects private-
sector auxiliary functions captures the fact that how much a higher 𝑑 (lower expected duration)
increases private-sector job search and vacancy posting depends on how the extra search will reduce
next-period unemployment.
The Markov-perfect equilibrium is then characterized by a system of functional equations (1),
(12)–(16), and (17)–(19). An analytical characterization of the Markov-perfect equilibrium is not
possible; instead, we solve for the equilibrium numerically by approximating the government policy
rules and private-sector decision rules using the Chebyshev collocation method.
4 Parametrization
We describe our calibration strategy in this section. The model period is one month. We calibrate
the parameters of the Markov equilibrium to match important features of the U.S. labor market
between 2003.I and 2007.IV.
The utility function is
𝑈(𝑐,𝑠) = 𝑐
1−𝜎
1− 𝜎 − 𝑣(𝑠),
where 𝑣(·) is the search cost function. We assume 𝑣(·) is a non-negative, strictly increasing, and
convex function, with the property that 𝑣(0) is bounded and 𝑣(0) ≥ 0. We specify the search cost
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function to be consistent with the literature:
𝑣(𝑠) = 𝛾
𝑠1+𝜑
1+ 𝜑 .
For any 𝛾 > 0, 𝑣 exhibits positive and increasing marginal cost, 𝑣𝑠(𝑠) > 0 and 𝑣𝑠𝑠(𝑠) > 0, and
𝑣(0) = 𝑣𝑠(0) = 0.
We adopt the matching function from den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), which is also used
in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010) among others,
𝑀(𝐼,𝑉 ) = 𝑉
[1+ (𝑉 /𝐼)𝜒]1/𝜒
,
where 𝐼 is the aggregate job search and 𝑉 is the aggregate vacancy posting in the economy. This
matching function guarantees that both the job-finding rate,
𝑓(𝜃) =
𝜃
[1+ 𝜃𝜒]1/𝜒
,
and the job-filling rate,
𝑞(𝜃) =
1
[1+ 𝜃𝜒]1/𝜒
,
are always strictly less than 1.
We pick three parameters related to preferences. The discount factor 𝛽 is 0.991/3, giving a
quarterly discount factor of 0.99. The coefficient of relative risk aversion 𝜎 is set to 1 (log utility).
Finally, the search cost curvature parameter 𝜑 is set to 1 following the average estimate in the
literature.20
The externally calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1. Following the methodology
outlined in Shimer (2005), we calculate the average monthly job separation rate from aggregate-level
CPS data.21 This gives an average job-finding rate during 2003.I-2007.IV of 0.40, and an average
separation rate 𝛿 = 0.02.22 We set the costs of vacancy creation 𝜅 to be 58% of monthly labor
productivity following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
As in Shimer (2005), labor productivity 𝑧 is taken to be the average real output per employed
person in the non-farm business sector. This measure is taken from the seasonally adjusted quarterly
20 Imposing 𝜑 equal to 1 gives a quadratic search cost function. This restriction is consistent with estimates by
Yashiv (2000), Christensen et al. (2005), and Lise (2013), and calibration work of Nakajima (2012).
21 To be consistent with our model, we do not adjust for time aggregation error when computing the job separation
rate. Therefore, the job separation rate from the data is 𝛿𝑡 = 𝑢𝑠𝑡+1/𝑒𝑡, where 𝑢𝑠 is short-term (one to four weeks)
unemployment, and 𝑒 is total employment.
22 Although some may argue that the U.S. economy during 2003.I-2007.IV is above the long-run trend, we believe it is
an appropriate period to target for the labor market, especially because of the secular downward trend in job separation
rate documented by, for example, Fujita (2012). Appendix B also documents a declining trend in job-finding rate since
1951. Given these trends, using the long-run average job-finding and separation rates would overestimate the recent
steady-state numbers.
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Table 1: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
𝛿 U.S. job separation rate 0.02
𝜅 Vacancy posting cost 0.58
𝜌 Persistence of productivity 0.968
𝜎𝜖 Standard deviation of innovation to productivity 0.0060
𝜖𝑤 Elasticity of wage with respect to productivity 0.446
Note: Calibration targets are monthly statistics of the U.S. economy.
data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We normalize the mean productivity to be 𝑧 = 1,
and assume an AR(1) process for the shock to 𝑧:
log𝑧′ = 𝜌 log𝑧 + 𝜎𝜖𝜖,
where 𝜌 ∈ [0,1), 𝜎𝜖 > 0, and 𝜖 are i.i.d. standard normal random variables. We target a quar-
terly autocorrelation of 0.762 and an unconditional standard deviation of 0.013 for the HP-filtered
productivity process. At a monthly frequency this means setting 𝜌= 0.9680 and 𝜎𝜖 = 0.006.
Wages are function of productivity with the following functional form,
𝑤(𝑧) = exp(log ?¯?+ 𝜖𝑤 log𝑧),
where ?¯? represents the steady-state share of output for the worker, and 𝜖𝑤 is the elasticity of the
average wage with respect to aggregate productivity. We use data on labor productivity and real
wages (constructed using labor shares data) between 1951.I and 2014.IV to estimate 𝜖𝑤 = 0.446. This
means a 1 percentage point increase in labor productivity is associated with a 0.446 percentage point
increase in real wages. Our estimate is close to the estimate of 0.449 for 1951.I-2004.IV obtained by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
We jointly calibrate four parameters using steady-state moments. The four parameters are (1)
the value of home production (and leisure) ℎ, (2) the matching function parameter 𝜒, (3) the level
parameter of search cost 𝛾, and (4) the steady-state wage level ?¯?. We use four steady-state moments
as targets: (1) the expected UI replacement ratio, (2) the average job-finding rate, (3) the average
job-filling rate, and (4) the proportion of unemployed workers with benefits.23 We follow Shimer
(2005) and set the replacement ratio at 40%. The average job-finding rate is the monthly rate at
which unemployed workers become employed, and it is 0.40 for 2003.I-2007.IV. Over the same period,
the job-filling rate is 0.66.24 Table 2 reports these internally calibrated parameter and the matching
23 We use a derivative-free algorithm for least-squares minimization to perform joint calibration. See Zhang, Conn,
and Scheinberg (2010) for details.
24 The job-filling rate is calculated as the job-finding rate divided by the vacancy-unemployment ratio, where the
latter is computed using the national unemployment rate reported by the BLS and the nonfarm job openings from the
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Table 2: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
ℎ Value of home production 0.595
𝛾 Disutility of search 1.706
𝜒 Matching parameter 3.462
?¯? Steady-state wage 0.979
Target Data Model
Average replacement ratio 40% 38.1%
Average job-finding rate 0.40 0.416
% unemployed with benefits 45 45.8
Average job-filling rate 0.66 0.661
Note: Calibration targets are monthly statistics of the U.S. economy 2005.I-2007.IV.
of calibration targets. The calibrated model delivers a benefit duration of 26.3 weeks, very close to
the benefit duration of 26 weeks in the U.S. during normal times, thus delivering the first model
validation.
Table 3 compares labor market statistics in the pre-2008 U.S. economy and the calibrated Markov
economy.25 The calibrated model does a good job of generating the relevant cyclical properties, which
provides the second model validation for our theory. The model also produces negative correlation
between unemployment and vacancy, thus preserving the shape of the Beveridge-curve (inverse re-
lation between unemployment and vacancy). Two parameters allow our model to match cyclical
properties well. First, we calibrate the elasticity of wage with respect to productivity to match data
counterparts. The relatively low wage elasticity means firm’s profit and hence vacancy posting are
volatile over the business cycle. Second, by targeting the average replacement ratio, we obtain a high
value of home production, which contributes to high volatility in job search. Unlike Shimer (2005)
and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the benefit level in our model is endogenously chosen by the
government and is a function of home production in steady state. As such, we can use the home
production value to target replacement ratio.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we present the Markov government policy rules and discuss their effects on the
equilibrium labor market.
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. The estimate for the 2003.I-2007.IV period is close to den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) who use plant-level data during 1972.II–1988.IV and get a job-filling rate of 0.71.
25 We use statistics from pre-Great Recession as the empirical counterpart to evaluate whether our model with average
job separation rate can generate the long-run volatilities. In Section 6 we introduce shocks to the job separation rate
to look at the labor market during the Great Recession.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Cyclicality
Productivity Unemployment Vacancy v-u ratio
Statistic 𝑧 𝑢 𝑣 𝑣/𝑢
Quarterly U.S. data 1951.I-2007.IV
Standard deviation 0.013 0.123 0.142 0.257
Correlation matrix
𝑧 1 -0.271 0.392 0.339
𝑢 - 1 -0.889 -0.951
𝑣 - - 1 0.980
𝑣/𝑢 - - - 1
Calibrated Markov economy
Standard deviation 0.013 0.147 0.167 0.273
Correlation matrix
𝑧 1 -0.908 0.919 0.982
𝑢 - 1 -0.698 -0.909
𝑣 - - 1 0.933
𝑣/𝑢 - - - 1
Note: Seasonally adjusted unemployment, 𝑢, is constructed by the BLS from the CPS. Vacancy-posting, 𝑣, is Barnichon
(2010)’s spliced series of seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index constructed by the Conference Board and
the job-posting data from the JOLTS. Both 𝑢 and 𝑣 are quarterly averages of monthly series. All variables are reported
in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1,600.
5.1 Markov equilibrium policy rules
Figure 2 plots the Markov equilibrium policy rules for UI policies holding productivity at the steady
state level.26 In each plot, the solid line represents policy rule, and the dashed line represents
steady-state unemployment.
The expected UI duration 1/𝑑 increases in total unemployment. The decision on UI duration
involves a trade-off between insurance (for higher current consumption) and job-creation (for higher
future welfare). When unemployment is high, both the insurance and job-creation incentives are
high—the former because more people are unemployed, and the latter because shorter duration
would increase job-search incentives for more people through their expectations of future UI policies.
In equilibrium, the increase in insurance incentive outweighs the higher job creation incentive, and
expected duration is longer at higher unemployment.
In contrast, the UI benefit level 𝑏 is lower at higher unemployment, but the scale of change
is minuscule, falling by less than 1% from steady state to 10% unemployment. Intuitively, when
unemployment is high, the cost of taxation rises slightly more than the gain from insurance. The
almost flat policy rule of 𝑏 reflects that when unemployment increases the rise in cost of taxation is
almost entirely offset by the higher gain from insurance.
26 We also hold the proportion of unemployed workers with benefits at the steady-state level.
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Markov policy ∙ Markov steady state
Figure 2: Markov equilibrium government policy rules holding productivity and proportion of benefit-eligible
unemployed workers at steady state.
Figure 3 plots the Markov equilibrium government policy rules, holding unemployment (both total
unemployment and benefit-eligible unemployment) at the steady-state levels. The expected duration
increases dramatically with lower labor productivity, especially when productivity is below its steady
state. This is because when productivity is low, the expected productivity next period is also low,
assuming a persistent productivity process. As such, the marginal return from production tomorrow
(for both workers and firm) is low, as is the cost of low job creation today (high unemployment
tomorrow). As a result, the marginal cost of longer duration (lower job creation) is low, and the
government chooses long duration. The unemployment benefit level 𝑏, in contrast, increases with
higher labor productivity, but the slope is fairly small, indicating very small changes with respect to
labor productivity.
5.2 Comparative static analysis of government incentives
Because the government’s choice of 𝑑 (which directly translates into expected duration) involves the
trade-off between insurance and moral hazard, we conduct comparative static analysis to understand
changes in these two incentives that drive the movements in expected duration. Figure 4 shows
responses of these two incentives to changes in unemployment (left panel) and productivity (right
panel).27
As total unemployment rises, both insurance gains and moral hazard cost are higher. More
specifically, when unemployment is higher, longer UI duration has a larger insurance effect because
it extends benefit coverage to more unemployed workers. In terms of the GEE (Equation 18), this
27 The responses over unemployment hold constant the proportion of benefit-eligible unemployed workers and pro-
ductivity at steady state. The responses over productivity hold total and benefit-eligible unemployment at steady state.
Both subplots hold UI policies at steady state.
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Markov policy ∙ Markov steady state
Figure 3: Markov equilibrium government policy rules holding unemployment at steady state.
effect affects the marginal effect of government choice 𝑑 (and hence expected duration) on current
welfare (part of 𝑅𝑑):
− 𝑢1 × [𝑈 (ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 )]⏟  ⏞  
welfare gain from giving benefits to an additional worker
(20)
With higher unemployment (𝑢) and fixing the proportion of benefit-eligible unemployed workers
(𝑢1/𝑢), 𝑢1 in expression (20) is larger, which increases the marginal welfare gain from a smaller 𝑑
(longer expected duration). At the same time, higher unemployment makes future unemployment
more sensitive to changes in search induced by changes in the current UI policy, and as a result,
longer UI duration has a larger moral hazard cost. The left panel of Figure 4 shows that a 1%
increase in total unemployment raises the insurance incentive by 16% and moral hazard cost by
9%. The higher increment in insurance incentives means that at a higher unemployment level, the
government has a stronger incentive to increase expected UI duration.
In response to a drop in productivity, both insurance gains and moral hazard cost are lower. In
particular, lower productivity leads to lower wages, which increases the employed workers’ marginal
utility of consumption and reduces the marginal gain from insurance. This effect is small, and
disappears if workers are risk neutral. In contrast, the drop in moral hazard cost is larger. In response
to a lower productivity, the expected future productivity and wages are also lower, which means that
future unemployment leads to a smaller reduction in average consumption. In other words, there is
lower moral hazard cost as a result of lower average search induced, and the government can “afford”
to choose longer duration. The drop in moral hazard cost is amplified by a drop in job posting—result
of lower productivity and hence lower expected future profit—which lowers the response of future
unemployment to changes in the duration policy. This amplification accounts for the nonlinear shape
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Responses to a 1pp increase in unemployment Responses to a 1% drop in productivity
Marginal gain from insurance ∙ Marginal cost of moral hazard Steady state
∙ 1% increase in unemployment (or drop in productivity)
Figure 4: Responses of marginal gain from insurance and marginal moral hazard cost to a 1 percentage-point
increase in unemployment or 1% drop in productivity, holding government policies at the steady state.
of duration policy in response to productivity changes.
The variations of marginal welfare gain and cost here are consistent with recent empirical findings
by Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015). First, they find that the moral hazard cost is procyclical. The
marginal cost of moral hazard here varies positively in both unemployment and productivity and is
overall procyclical.28 Second, they find that the marginal welfare gain from consumption smoothing
varies positive with the unemployment but variations are small. The marginal gain from insurance
in our mechanism also varies positively with unemployment, but the scale of variation is large. This
is because the gain from consumption smoothing that they document is only part of the gain from
insurance in our mechanism. Most of the variations in the gain from insurance in the left panel
of Figure 4 come from an extensive margin: when unemployment is high, the gain from extending
benefits to more unemployed workers is high because it increases the average consumption of all
unemployed workers.
5.3 Impulse response in policy and labor market
We now consider the economy’s response to a one-time, unanticipated drop in productivity. Figure
5 shows the response of the economy to a 1% drop in productivity 𝑧 at time 0. We first focus on the
responses with Markov policy (solid blue lines). We then compare the responses of the economy with
and without (dotted red lines) government policy changes to understand the driving forces behind
28 While we distinguish between a drop in productivity and an increases in unemployment, the empirical work of
Kroft and Notowidiglo (2015) does not. So their result that moral hazard cost is higher when the unemployment rate
is lower should not be directly compared to the left panel of Figure 4.
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Markov policy Constant policy Markov steady state
Figure 5: Impulse response to a 1% drop in productivity.
movements in the labor market.29 Because the transition dynamics are relatively slow, it takes a
long time for the economy to return to a steady state. In Figure 5, the time horizon is 90 months or
approximately seven and half years.
Upon shock, expected duration rises immediately from 26.3 weeks to 33 weeks and then falls
slowly as productivity recovers. By month 30, expected duration has fallen to 29 weeks. Since
unemployment is a slow-moving process, it peaks at around month 7, when productivity has already
recovered one-fifth of the 1% drop. Because expected duration rises with higher unemployment, the
drop in expected duration after the initial rise is slowed by the rising unemployment. Benefit level,
in contrast, falls to below steady state on impact, with less than 1% total change, and slowly recovers
to the pre-shock steady state as both productivity and unemployment recover.30
Search by both benefit-eligible and benefit-ineligible unemployed workers fall upon impact, which
29 Appendix D provides impulse responses of other labor market statistics.
30 The benefit level in our model is slightly procyclical. This is because during a recession, lower wages and higher
total unemployment raises the marginal cost (in utility terms) of providing benefits. Even though the scale of changes
is small, the procyclical benefits go against what happens in a typical recession. To be more realistic, it is reasonable
to think that during a recession, the government has a more lax budget and does not have to impose lower benefit
levels.
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drives average search down by about 10%. While benefit-eligible unemployed workers search less in
response to much longer expected UI duration, the benefit-ineligible unemployed workers respond
mainly to lower expected future output and wages. Vacancy posting also falls initially but the
recovery is much quicker than the job search recovery. By month 6, vacancy posting is more than
half-way back to the pre-shock steady-state level. This is because vacancy posting depends on
expected future productivity and aggregate search. As search by individual unemployed workers
recovers, and with high unemployment during the first few months after shock, aggregate search is
high.31 Because higher aggregate search increases the marginal return from vacancy posting, vacancy
posting responds to aggregate (and not average) search. Total unemployment increases rapidly to
peak in month 7, before gradually falling back to its steady-state level.
To understand to what extent the rise in unemployment is driven by changes in policy versus
productivity, we shut down changes in government policy and only allow the labor market to respond
to changes in productivity. Compared to unemployment increases with policy changes (solid blue
lines), the increases without policy change (dotted red lines) are much more muted (1% versus 5%).
Behind the difference in unemployment are smaller drops in both search and vacancy posting without
policy change. In particular, the average search drops by less than 1%, compared to a 9% decrease
with policy changes. The drop in vacancy posting without policy changes is about half of the drop
with policy change. The larger difference in search reflects that job search incentives are distorted
by policy changes whereas vacancy posting incentives respond mostly to productivity changes.
6 UI Duration Extensions in Recession
Because the cyclical properties of Markov equilibrium policy rules are consistent with those of the
U.S. policy, in this section we use the theoretical framework to study recessions. We first validate
the model by using the model to account for expected duration variations during and after the Great
Recession (December 2007 to December 2013). We then compare the Markov policy to alternative
UI policies to study the impacts on unemployment and welfare.
6.1 Empirical evidence of UI benefit extensions in recessions
We first document variations in UI duration during each recession since the 1970s. Figure 6 plots
variations in unemployment and UI duration during all five recession episodes.32 The shaded areas
represent National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) official recession dates. For each recession
episode, the dotted red line (right axis) plots the unemployment rate, and the solid blue line (left
axis) plots the maximum expected UI duration in weeks. The timing and extent of changes in UI
31 Additional impulse response in Appendix D shows above steady-state aggregate search during the first few months
after shock.
32 The recession from January to July 1980 was both shorter and milder than the other recessions. In addition, it
was followed immediately by the much longer recession from July 1981 to November 1982. We therefore left out the
former recession period.
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Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Unemployment rate
Figure 6: Empirical changes in unemployment (right axis) and UI duration (left axis) during recessions since
the 1970s.
duration follow the specifics of the federal unemployment compensation laws, which are available
from the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration (DOLETA) website.
Two things are worth noting. First, during all recession episodes, UI duration reached its highest level
around the time unemployment peaked. Second, comparing across recessions, recession with higher
unemployment is associated with in general higher expected UI duration. This, however, was not
true for the 1980s recession. The fact that Markov benefit duration rises with total unemployment
is consistent with the above historical evidence.
Because more detailed data are available for the Great Recession, Figure 7 documents the fre-
quency of legislation on UI policy during and following the recession. The vertical dotted lines
indicate the timings of legislation. The frequency of legislation increased substantially from the mid-
2008, especially from late 2009, to 2011. This provides evidence that during the recessions the federal
government does not follow a prescribed policy rule and instead makes policy choices depending on
the contemporary states of the economy.33 This observation motivates our choice to use the Markov
33 There is an automatic benefit extensions program called Extended Benefits (EB), whereby the benefit duration
is automatically extended when a state’s unemployment rate exceeds 6.5% or 8%. The EB extensions are triggered in
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Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Weighted UI duration (weeks) UI legislation
Figure 7: Empirical changes in UI duration and timing of UI-related legislation during the Great Recession.
policy, which is time consistent and without commitment, to describe the policy changes during the
recession.
Because state-level implementations of UI benefit extension are conditional on state economic
conditions, especially on the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) and total unemployment rate
(TUR), we use the two statistics to compute whether the state was eligible for longer durations in the
month a UI-related legislation was passed during the Great Recession. We then create a weighted
measure of expected UI duration across states using the number of total insured unemployed workers
in each state as the weight. Appendix A contains more details. Figure 7 plots weighted expected
UI duration with a dashed blue line. For the quantitative analyses, we use this weighted average
series as the empirical counterpart because it is a more accurate description of the UI duration policy
implemented.
6.2 The Great Recession
To further our theory, we put the model in an environment similar to the U.S. economy during and
following the Great Recession from December 2007 to December 2013. Because our theory focuses
on UI, we specify a path for productivity to match the observed unemployment path during the
period.34 We use a piecewise linear productivity process consisting of the decline, the trough and,
a state regardless of the national economic conditions or what the Congress decides. So in a sense this is a commited
extensions program, in contrast to the discretionary extensions implemented in recessions. During the Great Recession,
the EB extensions represent about one-third of the total overall maximum extensions. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for pointing this out.
34 Appendix D includes two alternative calibrations where we use productivity 𝑧 to either match the path of UI
duration or get a best fit for both unemployment and duration. The benchmark calibration of productivity process
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Figure 8: Exogenous shock processes during the Great Recession.
the recovery. It turns out that this simplified way of calibrating the productivity path generates
good fit for unemployment. The job separation rates over this period are exogenous and calculated
from aggregate-level CPS data. This path is then fed into the model assuming they are unexpected
shocks and the agents expect future separation rate to return to its steady state. In Section 6.2.5 we
look at the case where the agents have an expectation about how future job separation rate evolves.
Figure 8 plots these shock processes.35
Model Fit Given the shock processes, Figure 9 plots the variations in UI duration, labor market
variables, and average welfare generated by the Markov equilibrium (solid blue line). Compared to
the U.S. economy (dashed black line), the Markov equilibrium matches well the variations in UI
duration and the vacancy-unemployment ratio. In particular, the Markov expected duration policy
rises from 26 weeks to slightly below 80 weeks, compared to the maximum of 90 weeks in the U.S.
economy. The Markov policy also generates a decline in expected duration, but the decline starts
earlier than in the U.S. economy. The Markov policy captures the sudden drop and slow rise in the
vacancy-unemployment ratio as observed in the U.S. economy, but underestimates the scale of the
drop. One reason for the smaller drop in the vacancy-unemployment ratio is that the model does not
have job-to-job transition. During recessions, job-to-job transition, in addition to unemployment-
to-job transition, declines, and as a result, vacancy posting should decline more when job-to-job
here is the preferred one because while unemployment is a smooth process (and reported on a weekly basis), UI duration
is not because Congress meets on a relatively fixed schedule that does not respond to changes in economic conditions.
Therefore, matching to UI duration is subject to underlying assumptions about meeting schedules.
35 The process we specify for labor productivity is in fact not far-fetched. Labor productivity as measured by average
production per person in the nonfarm business sector by 3% from the end of 2007 to the beginning of 2009, which
is more than 4% in detrended terms. The difference between our process and the U.S. process is the recovery path.
U.S. labor productivity recovered swiftly to pre-2008 levels by the end of 2010, whereas our process follows a slower
recovery process. For theories on slow and/or jobless recovery following the Great Recession, see, for example, Stock
and Watson (2012), Shimer (2012), and Heathcote and Perri (2015). In addition, McGrattan and Prescott (2010, 2014)
suggest that labor productivity calculated from the data—especially during the 1990s and the Great Recession—are
mismeasured. This paper does not take a stand on what the true labor productivity is and instead use the observed
unemployment path to discipline productivity.
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Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
Figure 9: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession: Model, data, and counter-
factual policies.
transition is taken into account.
6.2.1 Policy Evaluation
One interesting question we study using the model is whether and how much do benefit extensions
contribute to higher the unemployment rates. We use the counterfactual where the government does
not do benefit extensions but instead keeps benefit duration at 26 weeks throughout the recession
(and the private sector fully understands it). Figure 9 shows that, in contrast to the no-extension
policy (dotted red line), the Markov benefit extensions policy leads to higher unemployment rates.
At the peak of unemployment, unemployment is lower by more than 3 percentage points in the
economy without extensions.
A key prediction of our theory is that search effort is procyclical, that it falls during recessions.
This feature is present in the standard search model with endogenous search effort. The empirical
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findings on the cyclicality of search effort are mixed.36 More recently, Gomme and Lkhagvasuren
(2015), after controlling for heterogeneity in the unemployed worker’s past wages and hours, find
evidence that search is procyclical, consistent with the prediction of structural search literature.
Welfare Evaluations We perform the welfare evaluation of extensions at two points in time. First,
consistent with how the effect on unemployment is evaluated, we look at the ex-post welfare. This
is computed at each point in time over the transition path as the average welfare of all workers
in the economy, after the the realization of shocks. The last panel of Figure 9 plots the welfare
during this period. Even though the Markov extensions substantially raised the unemployment, the
average welfare is higher with the Markov extensions. The difference in the average welfare over the
transition path roughly translates into 0.16% of average monthly consumption.37
Second, we compare the welfare at the start of the recession. This is an ex-ante comparison.
The difference here is the ex-ante evaluation is done without the knowledge of how the recession
would pan out, and agents in the economy expect future shocks to follow an AR(1) process. We
assume that an unexpected productivity shock occurs in January 2008, and perform the welfare
comparison after the realization of this shock. The question addressed by this exercise is, “should
the government follow the Markov rule or the no-extensions policy given this shock?” Interestingly,
the no-extensions policy gives slightly higher (less than 0.1% in consumption equivalent) average
welfare than the Markov policy rule ex ante. The reason for this welfare reversal is that the recession
during this period turns out to be both long and severe, which gives more justification for the Markov
policy.
6.2.2 The effect of expectation
To isolate the effect of expectation in our result, we shut down the channel of private sector’s
expectations. In particular, in this exercise we assume that the private sector expects future UI
duration (and benefit level) to stay at the steady-state level. At the same time, we assume that the
government implements the same policy as before ex-post. In other words, all benefit extensions
above the regular 26 weeks are “unanticipated.” Figure 10 illustrates the experiment by comparing
the economy under (1) Markov benefit extensions policy (solid blue line), (2) no benefit extensions
policy (dotted red line), and (3) unexpected extensions policy policy (dashed green line).
The unemployment gap between Markov extensions and unexpected extensions policies is large,
accounting for about 70% of the unemployment gap between the Markov extensions and the no-
extensions economics. This reflects the importance of expectations. When benefit-eligible unem-
ployed workers rationally expect the government to follow Markov policy, they reduce their job
36 Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama, Patterson, and Şahin (2006), for example, find countercyclical search effort, while
DeLoach and Kurt (2013) find evidence of procyclical search effort. See Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2015) for a brief
review of the empirical literature on search effort.
37 Even though shocks to both productivity and job separation rate contribute to cyclical fluctuations in the model,
the shock to productivity actually drives most of the movement. Appendix D provides an analysis where productivity
is kept at its steady-state level to isolate the effect of the shock to job separation rate.
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Markov extensions policy No extensions policy ∙ Unexpected extensions policy
Figure 10: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession: Effect of expectation.
search activities when productivity is low or when unemployment is high, because the expected long
UI duration next period distorts their search incentives. In contrast, when unemployed workers
expect the government to maintain a no-extensions policy, they do not reduce search as much.
Because the distortion on search incentives works only through unemployed worker’s expectation
of future UI policies, this exercise is also a decomposition of the unemployment gap into the “search”
wedge and the “composition” wedge. More specifically, the unemployment difference between Markov
extensions and the unexpected extensions represents the effect of policy distortion on search behav-
ior; the unemployment difference between the unexpected extensions and no-extensions economics
represents the effect of policy in changing the composition of the unemployed population—longer
duration increases the proportion of unemployed workers with benefits, thus reducing average search.
Interestingly, the average welfare of under unexpected extensions is higher than in the Markov
equilibrium. This is not surprising, because the former economy has both high current consumption—
from the ex-post Markov policy—and low future unemployment—due to the expectation of no-
extensions policy. But such an economy is in a sense “unsustainable” as it requires that the govern-
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ment always be able to “fool” the private sector.
6.2.3 Drivers of the ex-post welfare gap
The ex-post welfare gap between the Markov and no-extensions policies in Figure 9 are driven by two
opposing forces: the higher unemployment under the Markov policy reduces the average welfare in the
Markov economy relative to the no-extensions policy, whereas the higher proportion of unemployed
workers on benefits increases the average welfare of unemployed workers in the Markov economy.
Figure 11 illustrates these two forces.
Markov extensions policy No extensions policy
Figure 11: Drivers of welfare gap between Markov extensions and no extensions policies: Unemployment and
proportion unemployed on benefits.
The proportion of unemployed workers on benefits (middle panel) is calculated as 𝑢1(1− 𝑑)/𝑢.
Under the no-extensions policy, the proportion falls early in the recession. While both the measure of
benefit-eligible unemployed worker, 𝑢1, and the total unemployment, 𝑢, increase in response to rising
job separation rates and falling productivity, the rise in total unemployment is larger because the
job-finding rates of both benefit-eligible and benefit-ineligible unemployed workers fall. In contrast,
under the Markov policy, the initial rise in the proportion is mainly driven by the longer duration
policy (lower 𝑑).
The gap in benefit coverage between the two policies increases over time. At the time when
unemployment peaks, about 60% of unemployed workers are covered by UI benefits under the Markov
policy, whereas only 40% have benefits under the no-extensions policy. The higher benefit coverage
under the Markov policy leads to higher average welfare among unemployed workers relative to the
no-extensions policy. The welfare gap (right panel) between the Markov and no-extensions policies
is then the result of the welfare cost of higher unemployment being outweighed by the welfare gain
from higher benefit coverage ratio. An important reason for this result is that wages are low during
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the recession, which lower the marginal cost of unemployment.38
6.2.4 Relation to Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015)
The comparison between Markov equilibrium and the economy under no-extensions policy is in
line with Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015), who exploit discontinuity at state borders to
identify the effect of unemployment benefit extensions. In particular, one way to interpret their
empirical result is follows. In states where firms and workers expect good exogenous shocks to the
economy, e.g. an oil boom, they also expect lower or no benefit extensions. This increases the
expected value of employment to a worker and in turn increases job creation compared to states
with bad economic outlooks. This interpretation is very similar to our theory. With the Markov
policy, firms and workers expect longer benefit durations in recessions—analogous to states with bad
economic outlooks—whereas under the no-extensions policy, the private sector expects no-extensions
policy—an extreme case of states with good exogenous shocks.
Markov extensions policy No extensions policy
Figure 12: Markov extensions versus no extensions policy: Vacancy posting and average search.
One difference between our theory and Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman (2015) lies in the
mechanism underlying our results. In their model, longer benefit duration increases unemployed
worker’s outside option, thus increasing their reservation wage. Higher reservation wage then reduces
firm’s vacancy posting by reducing profit margin. In our model, longer expected duration makes
unemployment less painful and thus reduces job search activity. Reduced search activity then reduces
the marginal return to vacancy posting, lowering overall vacancy posting. To see how much of the
unemployment gap in Figure 9 comes from differences in vacancy posting as opposed to job search,
Figure 12 compares the Markov equilibrium and the economy under no-extensions policy along these
two dimensions. Both vacancy posting and average search are higher in the economy with no-
38 Another reason is that the long duration policy discourages search by the benefit-eligible unemployed workers,
which means even if benefit coverage were the same under the two policies, the average welfare of unemployed workers
would still be slightly higher under the Markov policy.
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extensions UI policy, but the gap is much larger for average search. This comparison reflects that in
our model both vacancy posting and search contribute to the unemployment gap, but average search
contributes more.
6.2.5 Cyclical job separation risk
So far the cyclical job separation rate is both exogenous and unexpected. As an alternative specifica-
tion, we make the job separation shock contingent on productivity in the model, so that the private
sector takes into consideration the cyclical job separation rate—and form expectations accordingly—
when making decisions. We specify the job separation rate process as
𝛿(𝑧) = 𝛿 + 𝐼𝛿(𝑧 − 𝑧),
where 𝛿 is the steady-state job separation rate, and 𝐼𝛿 < 0 is the rate of change of the separation
rate with respect to aggregate productivity. This formulation has the natural interpretation that the
job separation rate increases when profits are low. When labor productivity is low, wages are low as
wages are also a function of productivity. Because the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity
is less than 1, lower productivity means lower profit, or 𝑧−𝑤 in the model. To estimate this process
we use job separation and labor productivity data over 1951.I-2014.IV.
As before, productivity shock 𝑧 is exogenously specified to match the unemployment process.
The resulting labor productivity process requires a smaller drop than before—3.2% as opposed to
3.6% without changing separation risk. This is because the presence of countercyclical separation
rate reinforces the effect of productivity shock. Figure 13 shows the transitions for this alternate
specification.
6.3 Other recessions
As noted in the empirical analysis, longer UI duration is not just a phenomenon during the Great
Recession. Comparing across recession episodes since the 1970s, recessions with higher unemployment
were associated with, in general, higher UI durations. In this section, we test whether our model
delivers this characteristic. Because of the declining secular trend in job-finding and separation rates,
we need to recalibrate the model parameter to the pre-recession period for each recession episode.
Table 4 summarizes the labor market statistics for the pre-recession window for each recession.
As with the Great Recession, we use the path of job separation rate from data, and target observed
unemployment path to recover the path of productivity for each recession. Figure 14 displays model-
generated expected UI duration (solid blue line), unweighted UI duration from data (dashed blue
line), and model-generated unemployment (broken red line, right axis) for each recession documented
in the empirical analysis. Three observations are worth noting. First, the model matches increases
in UI duration reasonably well, producing more than 60% of the increases (solid blue line vs. dashed
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Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
Figure 13: With cyclical separation risk: UI duration, unemployment, and welfare during the Great Recession.
blue line) in each recession. Second, consistent with patterns documented from the data, during all
four recessions, model-generated UI duration reached its highest level around the time unemployment
peaked. Lastly, recessions where unemployment was higher (broken red line) also had, in general,
higher model-generated UI duration (solid blue line), except the 1980s recession. This evidence
shows that, as an additional model validation, our theory is able to generate not only quantitatively
significant UI duration increases in recessions, but also cross-time patterns consistent with the data.
While our model can rationalize benefit extensions during recessions, our theory is not successful
in generating the lack of actions (shortening of benefit durations) during normal times. However, it
is worth noting that the response of the Markov policy to productivity is not entirely symmetric.
In fact, the duration policy is nonlinear, increasing faster over regions of low productivity than it
decreases over regions of high productivity.39 This indicates that during times of high productivity
the Markov government would like to reduce benefit duration but the magnitude is much less than
the increases during a recession.
39 Shown in Figure 3 and discussesd in Section 5.2.
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Table 4: Calibration Targets for Other Recessions
Pre-recession labor market statistics
Recession Pre-recession period Separation Job finding Job filling
Nov 1973-Mar 1975 1973.I-1973.III 0.026 0.51 0.71
Jul 1981-Nov 1982 1980.II-1981.I 0.033 0.41 0.71
Jul 1990-Mar 1991 1988.I-1990.II 0.027 0.47 0.71
Mar 2001-Nov 2001 1999.I-2000.IV 0.020 0.49 0.66
Note: Job-filling rate pre-2000 are from den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
Model: Expected UI duration (weeks) ∙ Data: UI duration (weeks)
Model: Unemployment (right axis)
Figure 14: UI duration and unemployment in other recessions: Model versus data
7 The Role of Commitment
Our theory assumes no commitment by the government. In this section, we compare the Markov
policy with the policy chosen by a Ramsey government to illustrate the role of commitment.
The Ramsey government has commitment to all its future policies at the beginning of time.
The government’s decision problem is therefore to choose a sequence of unemployment benefit and
duration and tax policies {𝑏𝑡,𝑑𝑡}∞𝑡=0 to maximize the worker’s utility, taking into account how the
private sector will respond to these policies. At time 0, the government decides on its policies for
all future periods and for all possible realizations of shocks. The private sector takes government
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policies as given and follows the timing described in Section 2.
Equivalently, the government’s problem can be written as one of choosing policies {𝑏𝑡,𝑑𝑡,𝜏𝑡}∞𝑡=0,
and allocation and prices {𝑠0𝑡 ,𝑠1𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡,𝑢𝑡+1,𝑢1𝑡+1}∞𝑡=0 to maximize utility subject to the government
budget constraint and competitive equilibrium conditions. Formally,
Definition 3. (Ramsey policy) Given initial measures of unemployed population (𝑢0,𝑢𝑏,0) and ag-
gregate labor productivity 𝑧0, the optimal government policy with commitment consists of a sequence
of benefit level and duration and taxes {𝑏𝑡,𝑑𝑡}∞𝑡=0 that solves
max
{𝑏𝑡,𝑑𝑡,𝑠0𝑡 ,𝑠1𝑡 ,𝜃𝑡,𝑢𝑡+1,𝑢1𝑡+1}∞𝑡=0
E0
∞∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡𝑅(𝑢𝑡,𝑢1𝑡 ,𝑏𝑡,𝑑𝑡,𝑠0𝑡 ,𝑠1𝑡 )
over the set of all policies that satisfy the worker’s flow equations (2)-(3), and the private-sector
optimality conditions (9)-(11), for all time 𝑡 and aggregate shock {𝑧𝑡}∞𝑡=0.
For easy exposition, we use auxiliary functions 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝜂1 𝜂2, and 𝜂3 to denote the flow equations
and the three private-sector optimality conditions (9)-(11), respectively. Note that the three private-
sector optimality conditions play the role of incentive constraints in the optimal policy problem,
similar to the incentive constraints in a principal-agent setup such as Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).
To derive a set of conditions that characterize the Ramsey policy, we let 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑡𝜆𝑡, 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑡𝜆𝑏,𝑡, 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑡𝜇𝑡,
𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑡𝜇𝑏,𝑡, and 𝛽𝑡𝜋𝑡𝛾𝑡 be the Lagrange multipliers on 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝜂1 𝜂2, and 𝜂3, where 𝜋𝑡 is the probability
of a history realization {𝑧0,𝑧1, . . . ,𝑧𝑡} given an initial condition 𝑧0.
Proposition 2. Given initial conditions and the private-sector optimality conditions, the optimal
government policy can be characterized by the following government’s first-order conditions with
respect to 𝑏𝑡, 𝑑𝑡, 𝑠0𝑡 , 𝑠1𝑡 , 𝜃𝑡, 𝑢𝑡+1, and 𝑢1𝑡+1 for all time 𝑡 > 0 (highlights represent differences with the
Markov government optimality conditions):
𝑏 : 𝜇𝑡−1
?˜?1𝑏′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1
?˜?2𝑏′,𝑡−1
𝛽
−𝑅𝑏,𝑡 = 0
𝑑 : 𝜇𝑡−1
?˜?1𝑑′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1
?˜?2𝑑′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜆𝑡𝑓1𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑏,𝑡𝑓2𝑑,𝑡 −𝑅𝑑,𝑡 = 0
𝑠0 : 𝜇𝑡−1
?˜?1𝑠0′ ,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1
?˜?2𝑠0′ ,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜆𝑡𝑓1𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡?˜?1𝑠0,𝑡 −𝑅𝑠0,𝑡 = 0
𝑠1 : 𝜇𝑡−1
?˜?1𝑠1′ ,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1
?˜?2𝑠1′ ,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜆𝑏,𝑡𝑓2𝑑,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑏,𝑡?˜?2𝑠1,𝑡 −𝑅𝑠1,𝑡 = 0
𝜃 : 𝜇𝑡−1
?˜?1𝜃′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1
?˜?2𝜃′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝛾𝑡−1
?˜?3𝜃′,𝑡−1
𝛽
+ 𝜆𝑡𝑓1𝜃,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑏,𝑡𝑓2𝜃,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡?˜?1𝜃,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑏,𝑡?˜?2𝜃,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡?˜?3𝜃,𝑡 = 0
𝑢 : 𝜆𝑡𝑓1𝑢′,𝑡 − 𝛽E𝑡
{︀
𝑅𝑢,𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑡+1𝑓1𝑢,𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑏,𝑡+1𝑓2𝑢,𝑡+1
}︀
= 0
𝑢1 : 𝜆𝑏,𝑡𝑓1𝑢1′ ,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡E𝑡?˜?1𝑢1,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑏,𝑡E𝑡?˜?2𝑢1′ ,𝑡 − 𝛽E𝑡
{︀
𝑅𝑢1,𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑡+1𝑓1𝑢1,𝑡+1 − 𝜆𝑏,𝑡+1𝑓2𝑢1,𝑡+1
}︀
= 0 (RAM)
where primes denote next period, and subscripts are derivatives.
The period-𝑡 solution is state dependent. It depends on the current productivity 𝑧𝑡 and the
beginning-of-period unemployment level 𝑢𝑡, as well as multipliers (𝜇𝑡−1,𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1,𝛾𝑡−1). 𝜇𝑡 and 𝜇𝑏,𝑡
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are the marginal values of relaxing the optimal search condition for the unemployed worker without
and with benefit, respectively, and 𝛾𝑡 is the marginal value of relaxing the firm’s equilibrium free-
entry condition. The presence of 𝜇𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1, and 𝛾𝑡−1 as stated in the optimal policy captures
commitment—the Ramsey government in period 𝑡 has to deliver these marginal values, which it
promised workers and firms in period 𝑡− 1.
The key difference between the conditions characterizing the Ramsey and Markov policies is
that the Markov optimality conditions do not contain promised marginal values from the previous
period (terms containing 𝜇𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1, and 𝛾𝑡−1 as highlighted in red in RAM), because the Markov
government lacks commitment to future policies. 𝜇𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1, and 𝛾𝑡−1 represent the marginal
private values (shadow price) of optimal job-search and vacancy-posting behaviors in period 𝑡− 1.
These marginal values are affected by expected policy and allocations of period 𝑡. For example, more
generous UI in period 𝑡 reduces expected gains from search and vacancy posting, thus reducing job
creation in period 𝑡− 1. Because the Markov government cannot commit, it does not internalize how
current policy affects incentives in the previous period. As a result, its policy does not depend on
the values of 𝜇𝑡−1, 𝜇𝑏,𝑡−1, and 𝛾𝑡−1. In contrast, the Ramsey government chooses policies that can
deliver these promises, thus their presence in the Ramsey optimality conditions.
Note that commitment is assumed in the Ramsey case. If given the choice to break a promise, the
government will deviate from the sequence of policies prescribed by the government at time 0. The
government at period 𝑡 has an incentive to promise low future unemployment benefits to encourage
search and vacancy posting, because as explained in Section 2, current search (mainly search of the
benefit-eligible unemployed workers) is higher when expected future UI duration is shorter. However,
after the employment outcome in period 𝑡 is realized, the government has an incentive to provide
insurance to more unemployed workers by choosing longer duration. This incentive to deviate from
the original plan is what constitutes time inconsistency in the Ramsey problem.
7.1 A simple example to illustrate time inconsistency
We consider a simple example to illustrate the presence of time inconsistency in the Ramsey problem.
To simplify the illustration, we restrict the government to one policy instrument, the benefit level,
which the government sets for a future date. Higher future benefit level increases consumption of
ex-post unemployed workers but reduces ex-ante job search incentives.
There are two periods and one unit measure of workers. Workers search in the first period and
consume in the second period. Assume no time discounting and firms. In the first period, 1− ?¯? of
workers are guaranteed a job in the second period. The remaining ?¯?= 0.05 workers choose how much
to search, 𝑠 ∈ (0,1), for a job starting in the second period. Search incurs utility costs governed by
the convex function 𝑣(𝑠). Worker’s utility of consumption is given by 𝑈(𝑐).
With probability 𝑠, the worker finds a job and receives wage ?¯? = 1 in the second period; other-
wise, he receives unemployment benefit 𝑏 ∈ (0,1). Optimal choice of search is thus characterized by
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𝑣𝑠(𝑠) = 𝑈 (?¯?)−𝑈(𝑏). The number of unemployed workers in the second period is 𝑢= (1− 𝑠)?¯?. The
government in this economy chooses 𝑏 at the beginning of period 1 to maximize average utility
𝑊 = (1− 𝑢)𝑈(?¯?) + 𝑢 [𝑈 (𝑏)− 𝑣(𝑠)]
subject to 𝑢 = (1− 𝑠)?¯?
𝑣𝑠(𝑠) = 𝑈 (?¯?)−𝑈(𝑏).
Essentially, the government is solving
max
𝑠∈(0,1)
[1− (1− 𝑠)?¯?]𝑈(?¯?) + (1− 𝑠)?¯? [𝑈(?¯?)− 𝑣𝑠(𝑠)− 𝑣(𝑠)]
with first-order condition given by
?¯? [𝑣𝑠(𝑠) + 𝑣(𝑠)]− (1− 𝑠)?¯? [𝑣𝑠𝑠(𝑠) + 𝑣𝑠(𝑠)] = 0.
Let 𝑈(𝑐) = log(𝑐) and 𝑣(𝑠) = 𝑠22 . The government optimally chooses 𝑠* = 0.549, 𝑏* = 0.578, and
𝑢* = 0.0226, with average utility 𝑊 * = −0.0158.
Now suppose the government can revise benefits after workers have chosen 𝑠. Then the ex-post op-
timal policy is ?ˆ?= 1, with ex-post average utility given by ?ˆ? = (1−𝑢*) log ?¯?+ 𝑢*
[︁
log ?ˆ?− (𝑠*)2/2
]︁
=
−0.0034 >𝑊 *. In fact, any ?ˆ? > 𝑏* will result in higher ex-post average utility. The fact that there
exists a better policy ex-post illustrates the time inconsistency in this setup; time inconsistency, in
turn, means lack of commitment leads to different policy outcomes than an economy with government
commitment.
7.2 The long-run effect of commitment
We compare the steady-state Markov and Ramsey policies. The difference here is that the Markov
government lacks commitment over future policies, and hence does not consider the effect of current
policy on past allocations. For a fair comparison, we re-calibrate the Ramsey economy to match
the same set of steady-state statistics used to calibrate the Markov economy. Table 5 shows these
calibrated parameters and the target moments. The exogenously calibrated parameters are the same
as before.
Table 6 compares the steady-state benefit duration policy in the Markov economy and in the
Ramsey economy. Because both economies are calibrated to match the same steady-state replacement
ratio, benefit duration is the only source of policy difference in this comparison. Consistent with the
difference highlighted before, the Ramsey policy is less generous than the Markov policy because the
Ramsey government internalizes the effect of current policy on previous job creation.
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Table 5: Internally Calibrated Parameters: Ramsey
Parameter Description Value
ℎ Value of home production 0.397
𝛾 Disutility of search 4.432
𝜒 Matching parameter 2.263
?¯? Steady-state wage 0.979
Target Data Model
Average replacement ratio 40% 37.9%
Average job-finding rate 0.40 0.400
% unemployed with benefits 45 44.6
Average job-filling rate 0.66 0.660
Note: Calibration targets are monthly statistics of the U.S. economy 2005.I-2007.IV.
Table 6: Steady States: Markov versus Ramsey Policy
Statistic Markov Ramsey
Duration(weeks), 1/𝑑 26.3 16.8
Note: Steady states are computed using parameters calibrated to the same
set of steady-state moments.
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a quantitative theory of how a welfare-maximizing government uses UI policy
to balance the incentives of insurance against the cost of moral hazard arising from distortion in
unemployed workers’ job search incentives. We use the concept of Markov-perfect equilibrium to
study a time-consistent UI policy, where the government makes decisions each period contingent on
payoff-relevant aggregate states of the economy. In the steady state, our theory delivers an expected
UI duration close to the U.S. policy. Over the business cycle, the UI benefit level stays roughly
constant and the expected duration rises during recessions. Both the steady state and cyclical
properties of our theory are consistent with policies in the U.S. since the 1970s.
We then use the theoretical framework to study benefit extensions in the U.S. from 2008 to
2013. We find that compared to a UI policy fixed at the 2007 level, the Markov policy, which
matches most of the variations in benefit duration observed in the data, leads to an increase of 3
percentage points in the unemployment at its peak. Of this unemployment gap, we find that more
than two-thirds is driven by private-sector expectations: unemployed workers expect longer future
UI durations in recessions and as a result reduce job search. More importantly, we find that a longer
UI duration during recessions is welfare improving. Compared to the scenario where the government
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does not change UI policies, the benefit extensions lead to higher welfare equivalent to 0.16% of
average consumption. This finding provides a new perspective to the debate over whether UI benefit
extensions are good policy.
Because our theory assumes no commitment by the government, we compare the Markov policy
to the Ramsey policy to see how much non-commitment matters in the long run. When calibrated
separately to the same set of targets, the steady-state Ramsey UI duration is much lower, reflecting
the Ramsey government’s ex-ante incentives to stimulate job search.
Several simplifying assumptions are made for tractability. First, neither workers nor government
can save or borrow. Because savings provide self-insurance to workers, allowing workers to save will
reduce the need for government-provided insurance policy. At the same time, credit access may
reduce search by the unemployed (see, for example, Herkenhoff (2015)), thus exacerbating moral
hazard associated with search. The reduced need for insurance and increased moral hazard problem
will likely reduce the cyclical response of benefit duration. Allowing government access to the credit
market will increase the cyclical responses of the benefit duration and likely make the benefit level
less procyclical (or more acyclical). This is because the government can borrow to finance a generous
benefit policy in bad times and pay back the debt with tax revenue in good times.
The second assumption is that government policy takes effect right away. In reality, there often
is a time lag between legislation and implementation. Allowing the government to announce pol-
icy changes before implementation gives workers and firms time to react to the potential changes,
which may mitigate the effect of policy changes (“announcement effect”). However, by looking at UI
legislations during the Great Recession, we find that most extensions came into effect shortly after
announcement. Furthermore, the announcement effect, if any, is likely small quantitatively. Naka-
jima (2012), for example, incorporates announcement effect in his evaluation of benefit extensions
and finds minor quantitative effect associated with announcement.
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A Unemployment insurance benefit extensions in the Great Re-
cession
States unemployment insurance and the federal government have adjusted unemployment benefits through
the duration margin. In normal circumstances and under the regular program: Unemployment Compensation
(UC), an eligible unemployed worker may receive unemployment benefits up to 26 weeks in most states.
During economic downturn, automatic benefits extensions are triggered under the Extended Benefits (EB)
program. The duration is 13 or 20 weeks depending on the state’s insured unemployment rate (IUR) or the
total unemployment rate (TUR). In addition, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) has
been launched in 2008 and has been redefined in the ARRA context in 2009. It also increases the maximum
benefits duration. Four waves called “Tiers” have been implemented. The first one (Tiers I) is effective without
any conditions on states’ experience with unemployment. Tiers II, III and IV require a condition on the IUR
and/or TUR to be effective.
For these purposes, we extract the series of the IUR and TUR for 51 states of the US and compute if the
state is eligible for the EB and the EUC08 programs. The sum of these three programs gives the maximum
duration of unemployment benefits for each state. It is weighted in order to build an aggregate indicator. We
assume the weights are equal to the number of total insured unemployed workers in the state divided by the
total insured unemployed workers in the US. Statistics on insured unemployment population comes from the
U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration. Table A.1 reports a timeline for policy
changes and unweighted expected maximum duration under the EUC08 and EB programs.
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Table A.1: Federally-Funded Unemployment Insurance Extensions 2008-2013
Start date Program extension of EUC08 End date Additional Weeks
Jul 2008 13 weeks for all states Nov 2008 13
Nov 2008 Tier I: 20 weeks for all stats Mar 2009 33
Tier II: 13 weeks for states with TUR ≥ 6%
Mar 2009 keep exisiting structure Nov 2009 33
Nov 2009 Tier I - 20 weeks for all states Dec 2009 53
Tier II: 14 weeks for all states
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5%
Dec 2009 keep exisiting structure Aug 2010 53
Mar 2010 keep exisiting structure Sep 2010 53
Apr 2010 keep exisiting structure Nov 2010 53
Jul 2010 keep exisiting structure May 2011 53
Dec 2010 keep exisiting structure Jun 2012 53
Dec 2011 keep exisiting structure Aug 2012 53
Feb 2012 Tier I: 20 weeks for all states May 2012 53
Tier II: 14 weeks for all states
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 8.5%
(16 weeks if no active EB and TUR ≥ 8.5%)
Jun 2012 Tier I: 20 weeks for all states Sep 2012 53
Tier II: 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III: 13 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%
Tier IV: 6 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%
Sep 2012 Tier I: 14 weeks for all states Dec 2012 47
Tier II: 14 weeks if states TUR ≥ 6%
Tier III: 9 weeks if states TUR ≥ 7%
Tier IV: 10 weeks if states TUR ≥ 9%
Jan 2013 keep exisiting structure Dec 2013 47
Start date Program extension of EB End date Additional Weeks
Feb 2009 6.5% 13 week IUR and IUR ≥ 110% of prior 3 years Dec 2013 138% 13 week IUR and IUR ≥ 110% of prior 3 years 26
Source: DOLETA, Whittaker and Isaacs (2013), Albertini and Poirier (2015)
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B Secular Decline in Job Finding and Separation Rates
Figure B.1: Secular decline in job finding and separation rates
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C Derivations and Proofs
C.1 Derivation of private sector optimality conditions
Throughout this section, we drop the dependence of functions on productivity shock 𝑧 to economize on
notation.
• Solving problem of unemployed person without benefit by taking derivative with respect to 𝑠0
𝑣𝑠(𝑠0)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽[𝑉 𝑒
′ − 𝑉 0′ ] (21)
Solving problem of unemployed person with benefit by taking derivative with respect to 𝑠1
𝑣𝑠(𝑠1)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽[𝑉 𝑒
′ − 𝑑′𝑉 0′ − (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1′ ] (22)
Using worker’s bellman equations
𝑉 𝑒 − 𝑉 0
= 𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )− [︀𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 )− 𝑣(𝑠0)]︀ . . .
· · ·+ 𝛽(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)[𝑉 𝑒′ − 𝑉 0′ ]− 𝛽𝛿[𝑉 𝑒′ − (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1′ − 𝑑′𝑉 0′ ] (23)
𝑉 𝑒 − 𝑑𝑉 0 − (1− 𝑑)𝑉 1
= 𝑑
[︁
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ) + 𝑣(𝑠0) + 𝛽(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)(𝑉 𝑒′ − 𝑉 0′)− 𝛽𝛿(𝑉 𝑒′ − (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1′ − 𝑑′𝑉 0′)
]︁
. . .
+(1− 𝑑)
[︁
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 ) + 𝑣(𝑠1) + 𝛽(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1 − 𝛿)(𝑉 𝑒′ − 𝑑′𝑉 0′ − (1− 𝑑′)𝑉 1′)
]︁
(24)
Combine (23) with (21) and (22)
𝑉 𝑒 − 𝑉 0 = 𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ) + 𝑣(𝑠0) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
Update one period, and substitute into (21)
𝑣𝑠(𝑠0)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽
[︃
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′)
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′)
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
Combine (24) with (21) and (22)
𝑉 𝑒 − 𝑑𝑉 0 − (1− 𝑑)𝑉 1
= 𝑑
[︂
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ) + 𝑣(𝑠0) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0)
𝑓(𝜃)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
]︂
+(1− 𝑑)
[︂
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 )−𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏− 𝜏 ) + 𝑣(𝑠1) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1 − 𝛿)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1)
𝑓(𝜃)
]︂
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Update one period, and substitute into (22)
𝑣𝑠(𝑠1)
𝑓(𝜃)
= 𝛽𝑑′
[︃
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ− 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠0′) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠0′)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
0′)
𝑓(𝜃′)
− 𝛿 𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′)
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
+𝛽(1− 𝑑′)
[︃
𝑈(?¯?− 𝜏 ′)−𝑈(ℎ+ 𝑏′ − 𝜏 ′) + 𝑣(𝑠1′) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃′)𝑠1′ − 𝛿)𝑣𝑠(𝑠
1′)
𝑓(𝜃′)
]︃
• From unmatched firm’s value function, assuming free entry, i.e. 𝐽0(𝑢,𝑢1) = 0
𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
= 𝛽𝐽1(𝑢′,𝑢1′)
Then firm’s value function can be rewritten as
𝐽1(𝑢,𝑢1) = 𝑧 − ?¯?+ (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
Update one period
𝐽1(𝑢′,𝑢1′) = 𝑧 − ?¯?+ (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃′)
Substitute into the first equation
𝜅
𝑞(𝜃)
= 𝛽
[︂
𝑧 − ?¯?+ (1− 𝛿) 𝜅
𝑞(𝜃′)
]︂
C.2 Proof of proposition 1: derivation of Markov GEE
Throughout this section, we drop the dependence of functions on productivity shock 𝑧 to economize on
notation. Let 𝜆, 𝜆𝑏, 𝜇, 𝜇𝑏, 𝛾 be the Lagrange multipliers on (12)-(16), respectively.
1. Take derivatives of government’s problem with respect to 𝑏, 𝑑, 𝑠0, 𝑠1, 𝜃, 𝑢′ and 𝑢1′
𝑏 : 𝑅𝑏 = 0
𝑑 : 𝜆𝑓1𝑑 + 𝜆𝑏𝑓2𝑑 −𝑅𝑑 = 0
𝑠0 : 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 + 𝜇𝜂1𝑠0 −𝑅𝑠0 = 0
𝑠1 : 𝜆𝑏𝑓2𝑠1 + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑠1 −𝑅𝑠1 = 0
𝜃 : 𝜆𝑓1𝜃 + 𝜆𝑏𝑓2𝜃 + 𝜇𝜂1𝜃 + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝜃 + 𝛾𝜂3𝜃 = 0
𝑢 : 𝜆𝑓1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢′ = 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢
𝑢1 : 𝜆𝑏𝑓2𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢1′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢1′ = 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢1 (FOC)
where primes denote next period, and subscripts are derivatives. The first equation above 𝑅𝑏 = 0
characterize the government’s decision on benefit level.
2. Take derivative of Bellman equation with respect to 𝑢 and 𝑢1, respectively
𝐺𝑢 = 𝑅𝑢 +𝑅𝑏Ψ𝑏𝑢 +𝑅𝑑Ψ
𝑑
𝑢 +𝑅𝑠0𝑆
0
𝑢 +𝑅𝑠1𝑆
1
𝑢 + 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢Γ𝑢 + 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢1Γ
1
𝑢 (ENV1)
𝐺𝑢1 = 𝑅𝑢1 +𝑅𝑏Ψ
𝑏
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑑Ψ
𝑑
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑠0𝑆
0
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑠1𝑆
1
𝑢1 + 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢Γ𝑢1 + 𝛽𝐺
′
𝑢1Γ
1
𝑢1 (ENV2)
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substitute the last two FOCs into ENV1 and ENV2 to eliminate 𝛽𝐺′𝑢 and 𝛽𝐺′𝑢1
𝐺𝑢 = 𝑅𝑢 +𝑅𝑏Ψ𝑏𝑢 +𝑅𝑑Ψ
𝑑
𝑢 +𝑅𝑠0𝑆
0
𝑢 +𝑅𝑠1𝑆
1
𝑢
+Γ𝑢 {𝜆+ 𝜇𝜂1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢′}+ Γ1𝑢
{︀
𝜆𝑏 + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢1′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢1′
}︀
(25)
𝐺𝑢1 = 𝑅𝑢1 +𝑅𝑏Ψ
𝑏
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑑Ψ
𝑑
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑠0𝑆
0
𝑢1 +𝑅𝑠1𝑆
1
𝑢1
+Γ𝑢1 {𝜆+ 𝜇𝜂1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢′}+ Γ1𝑢1
{︀
𝜆𝑏 + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢1′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢1′
}︀
(26)
3. Differentiate 𝜂1, 𝜂2 and 𝜂3 with respect to 𝑢
𝜂1𝑢′Γ𝑢 + 𝜂1𝑢1′Γ
1
𝑢 = −𝜂1𝑠0𝑆0𝑢 − 𝜂1𝜃Θ𝑢 (27)
𝜂2𝑢′Γ𝑢 + 𝜂2𝑢1′Γ
1
𝑢 = −𝜂2𝑠1𝑆1𝑢 − 𝜂2𝜃Θ𝑢 (28)
𝜂3𝑢′Γ𝑢 + 𝜂3𝑢1′Γ
1
𝑢 = −𝜂3𝜃Θ𝑢 (29)
Given the worker flow equations
Γ(𝑢,𝑢1) = 𝛿(1− 𝑢) + 𝑓(Θ(𝑢,𝑢1))[︀𝑆0(𝑢,𝑢1)− 𝑆1(𝑢,𝑢1)]︀𝑢1(1−Ψ𝑑(𝑢,𝑢1)) . . .
+(1− 𝑓(Θ(𝑢,𝑢1))𝑆0(𝑢,𝑢1))𝑢
Γ1(𝑢,𝑢1) = 𝛿(1− 𝑢) + (1− 𝑓(Θ(𝑢,𝑢1))𝑆1(𝑢,𝑢1))𝑢1(1−Ψ𝑑(𝑢,𝑢1))
differentiate with respect to 𝑢
Γ𝑢 + 𝑓𝜃(𝜃)𝑠0𝑢Θ𝑢 + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑢𝑆0𝑢 − 𝑓𝜃(𝜃)(𝑠0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1(1− 𝑑)Θ𝑢 − 𝑓(𝜃)
[︀
𝑆0𝑢 − 𝑆1𝑢
]︀
𝑢1(1− 𝑑) . . .
+𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠0 − 𝑠1)𝑢1Ψ𝑑𝑢 = −𝛿 + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0) (30)
Γ1𝑢 + 𝑓𝜃(𝜃)𝑠
1𝑢1(1− 𝑑)Θ𝑢 + 𝑓(𝜃)𝑆1𝑢𝑢1(1− 𝑑) + (1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)𝑢1Ψ𝑑𝑢 = −𝛿 (31)
4. Substitute (27)-(31) and the FOCs into (25)
𝐺𝑢 = 𝑅𝑢 + 𝜆(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠0 − 𝛿)− 𝛿𝜆𝑏 (32)
Similarly, differentiate 𝜂1, 𝜂2, 𝜂3 and the worker’s flow equations with respect to 𝑢1, and substitute into
(26)
𝐺𝑢1 = 𝑅𝑢1 + 𝜆𝑓(𝜃)(𝑠
0 − 𝑠1)(1− 𝑑) + 𝜆𝑏(1− 𝑓(𝜃)𝑠1)(1− 𝑑) (33)
5. Update (32)-(33) and substitute into the last two FOCs, respectively
𝜆𝑓1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢′ = 𝛽
[︀
𝑅′𝑢 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢 − 𝜆′𝑏𝑓 ′2𝑢
]︀
(34)
𝜆𝑏𝑓2𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝜂1𝑢1′ + 𝜇𝑏𝜂2𝑢1′ + 𝛾𝜂3𝑢1′ = 𝛽
[︀
𝑅′𝑢1 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢1 − 𝜆′𝑏𝑓 ′2𝑢1
]︀
(35)
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6. Combine the FOCs to get rid of Lagrange multipliers (leaving only 𝜆)
𝜆𝑏 =
1
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑] (36)
𝜇 =
1
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] (37)
𝜇𝑏 =
1
𝜂2𝑠1
{︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑]
}︂
(38)
𝛾 = − 1
𝜂3𝜃
{︂
𝜆𝑓1𝜃 +
𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑] + 𝜂1𝜃𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂}︂
(39)
7. Rewrite (34)-(35) explicitly by substituting (36)-(39)
𝜆𝑓1𝑢′ +
𝜂1𝑢′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢′
𝜂2𝑠1
{︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑]
}︂
−𝜂3𝑢′
𝜂3𝜃
{︂
𝜆𝑓1𝜃 +
𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑] + 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂}︂
= 𝛽
{︂
𝑅′𝑢 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢 −
𝑓 ′2𝑢
𝑓 ′2𝑑
[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀}︂
(GEE1)
𝑓2𝑢1′
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑] +
𝜂1𝑢1′
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝑢1′
𝜂2𝑠1
{︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑]
}︂
−𝜂3𝑢1′
𝜂3𝜃
{︂
𝜆𝑓1𝜃 +
𝑓2𝜃
𝑓2𝑑
[𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑] + 𝜂1𝜃
𝜂1𝑠0
[𝑅𝑠0 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠0 ] +
𝜂2𝜃
𝜂2𝑠1
[︂
𝑅𝑠1 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑠1 −
𝑓2𝑠1
𝑓2𝑑
(𝑅𝑑 − 𝜆𝑓1𝑑)
]︂}︂
= 𝛽
{︂
𝑅′𝑢1 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑢1 −
𝑓 ′2𝑢1
𝑓 ′2𝑑
[︀
𝑅′𝑑 − 𝜆′𝑓 ′1𝑑
]︀}︂
(GEE2)
Equation (GEE2) characterizes the government’s decision on 𝑑, where 𝜆 has the interpretation of the
shadow price of unemployment and is characterized by equation (GEE1). Re-arrange to get the equations
in Proposition 1.
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D Additional Quantitative Analyses
D.1 Additional impulse responses
This section contains impulse response of some labor market statistics to a one-time 1% negative shock to
productivity. This figure complements Figure 5.
Figure D.1: Additional plots: Impulse response to 1% negative shock to productivity.
Markov policy Markov steady state
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D.2 Alternative calibration of productivity path during the Great Recession
This section presents alternative calibration of the productivity path 𝑧𝑡. Compare to Figure 9.
Figure D.2: Calibrating productivity to match benefit duration: Markov policy (solid blue line)
versus constant policy (dotted red line) versus U.S. data (dashed black line).
Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
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Figure D.3: Calibrating productivity path for best fit: Markov policy (solid blue line) versus constant
policy (dotted red line) versus U.S. data (dashed black line).
Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
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Figure D.4: Comparison of different calibration strategies of productivity path
Match to unemployment Match to UI duration
∙ Best-fit of unemployment and duration ∙ U.S. policy
Different calibrations of productivity path: Markov policy to match unemployment (solid blue line) versus
Markov policy to match duration (dotted red line) versus Markov policy for best-fit (dashed green line)
versus U.S. data (dashed black line).
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D.3 Isolating quantitative effects from job separation shock
This section restricts productivity shock 𝑧 to be constant at its steady-state level. The only exogenous shock
here is the shock to job separation rate 𝛿. Compared to Figure 9, both unemployment and expected UI
duration are much lower. Thus, productivity shock (and not shock to job separation rate) drives most of the
cyclical variations in the model.
Figure D.5: Expected UI duration and unemployment: Markov policy (solid blue line) versus constant
policy (dotted red line) versus U.S. data (dashed black line).
Markov extensions policy ∙ U.S. policy No extensions policy
55
